



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Is Immortality Desirable? By G. LOWES DICKINSON. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909. — pp. 63.

In this Ingersoll Lecture, delivered before Harvard University, the author attempts only to establish the desirability of survival after death. He does not undertake to establish any proofs for the dogma, except in so far as the desirability itself may be regarded as a proof and in so far as the evidences of spiritistic phenomena (p. 47), towards which he has a hesitatingly hospitable attitude, furnish confirmatory data. Although the author regards the question of whether or not immortality is a fact as an open question, he leaves no doubt how he has decided it for himself. In regard to the question of the desirability of immortality, Mr. Dickinson distinguishes three classes of men : (1) those that give the matter no thought ; (2) those who fear survival ; (3) those who desire it, and he thinks the majority of people belong to the first class, either because of the disagreeableness of the subject or because they are occupied with more immediate and tangible concerns. To the second class belong the pessimists, men who crave extinction after satiety with the cruel and unjust conditions of life. These are conceded to be commonly the more profound observers of existence. It is evident from the admitted statistics of these classifications, that the first two classes vastly outnumber the third. In other words, whether or not immortality is desirable, it is either not desired or is not actively desired by a majority. In regard to the minority, those who desire immortality, the number is further reduced by excluding a class who desire an undesirable immortality, as, *e. g.*, those Christians whose conception of survival involves both eternal heaven and hell. Mr. Dickinson omits all reference (pp. 21 ff.) to the Catholic purgatory, a place of transitory, purificatory punishment, although from the Council of Florence, 1439, this formed an article in the official creed in a large part of Christendom. The author abhors the doctrine of hell, whether it be Dante's or Tertullian's, — and so he casts in his lot with the Universalistic sect. But neither is the traditional heaven satisfactory. Heaven, in the author's meaning, is merely the "ultimate term of a process in which we are engaged" (p. 28), — the end of the process we can only vaguely characterize as the Good. Survival of death, therefore, is desirable only because of the enlarged opportunity it affords for ethical self-realization, for pursuing an ideal unreached in this life, for completing a process left at death unfinished and fragmentary. Some such heaven as this is indicated, in the author's opinion (p. 32), by our unrealized potentialities, and he believes that life here would be better and increased in value if we knew of such a life beyond. But as he says (p. 26) that hell is no deterrent to crime, one would be justified in asking how his heaven would be a stimulus to virtue.

As to what it is that persists in the desirable survival, the author inclines to agree with McTaggart. That which survives is the "substance of one's self" . . . "even though it carried with it no consciousness of survival" (p. 39). It is difficult to see what concern the individual would have in a

survival of this sort, for the essential individual is just conscious mind and its historical continuity, but if consciousness and with it personal identity lapse, then it would seem hardly worth while bothering about the future unfolding of one's potentialities, and the reviewer would beg to be stricken from the list of those desiring what, after all, is of no personal moment.

WM. A. HAMMOND.

Kant's Philosophy as Rectified by Schopenhauer. By M. KELLY. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1909. — pp. 128.

Not unlike Poe in literature, Schopenhauer has had, in philosophy, the misfortune of being ordinarily discussed either by hostile opponents, blind to his merits, or else by idolatrous worshippers, with no eye for his faults. Of the latter class and tendency, this little book is a fair sample. Feeling confident that "what is true in the transcendental philosophy is still either totally ignored or totally misunderstood" (p. 5), Dr. Kelly proposes to present the fundamentals of Kantianism, as criticised by Schopenhauer, whom he declares "worth ten times more than all the post-Kantian philosophers and professors put together" (p. 8).

The summary and somewhat court-martial fashion in which the author repeatedly disposes of knotty philosophical problems, renders the treatise of slender use to the serious student of the subject. To the novice in philosophy, for whom the book is apparently intended, little guidance is offered. The sixteen chapters manifest a strange lack of any sense of proportion in the handling of the material. Thirty pages,—one fourth of the entire monograph,—are spent on a note-book summary of *The Fourfold Root*. Yet there is no adequate discussion of Schopenhauer's *Weltprinzip*, as a proffered substitute for Kant's Thing-in-itself, nor of the doctrine of Freedom in the two philosophers. Well-known arguments are recapitulated, and sundry problems hastily taken up and cast aside one after another. But no attempt is made to state succinctly the fundamental problems at issue, or even to suggest the possibility of an interpretation of Kant's philosophy different from Schopenhauer's admittedly brilliant, but not infrequently erratic one. The result is that the reader closes the book with no clear conception of what it is all about.

Dr. Kelly seems to have read the post-Kantian Idealists largely in the anthologies that serve as chapter-finales in the revised editions of Schopenhauer's own works. Otherwise the notions which he has of certain philosophical conceptions remain a puzzle. On pages 96–97, for instance, he simply reiterates Schopenhauer's offhand dismissal of the Absolute, on the basis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a principle which explicitly applies only within phenomenal experience as such, and can therefore neither prove nor disprove the Absolute. This holds the more forcibly of an Absolute that is put forth as over and beyond phenomenal experience, as, *e. g.*, the Will,—a fact which the author clearly overlooks.

The style betrays an obvious weakness for certain trenchant turns of phrase